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We argue that once we take into account the students' rational enrollment decisions, mismatch in the
sense that the intended beneficiary of affirmative action admission policies are made worse off could
occur only if selective universities possess private information about students' post-enrollment treatment
effects. This necessary condition for mismatch provides the basis for a new test. We propose an empirical
methodology to test for private information in such a setting. The test is implemented using data from
Campus Life and Learning Project (CLL) at Duke. Evidence shows that Duke does possess private
information that is a statistically significant predictor of the students' post-enrollment academic performance.





























The use of racial preferences in college and university admissions has generated much debate.
Proponents of racial preferences argue that race-conscious admissions are important both for helping
minorities overcome the legacy of the institutionalized discrimination and for majority students to
receive the benets from diverse classrooms.1 Opponents of racial preferences assert that race-
conscious admissions are unfair and may actually be damaging to the intended beneciaries by
placing them at institutions where they are unlikely to succeed.2
Recently the controversy over race-conscious admission policies has increasingly moved from a
normative to a positive perspective. On one front, several papers attempted to empirically exam-
ine the educational benets of attending racially diverse colleges. For example, Black, Daniels and
Smith (2001) found a positive relationship between proportion of blacks in the college attended
and the post-graduate earnings in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth; Arcidiacono and
Vigdor (2009), using information on graduates of 30 selective universities in College and Beyond
data, found only weak evidence of any relationship between collegiate racial composition and the
post-graduation outcomes of white or Asian students.3 Duncan et. al. (2006), exploiting condi-
tional random roommate assignment at one large public university, found that cross-racial exposure
inuences individual attitudes and friendship patterns.
A second front, spurred by the provocative article of Sander (2004) and followed up by Ayres and
Brooks (2005), Ho (2005), Chambers et. al. (2005), Barnes (2007) and Rothstein and Yoon (2008),
attempts to empirically examine whether the eects of armative action policies on the intended
beneciaries is positive or negative. These papers essentially tests for the so-called \mismatch
hypothesis," i.e. whether the outcomes of minority students might have been worsened as a result
of attending a selective university relative to attending a less selective school.
But even if some of the outcomes for minority students are worse under armative action, it
still may be the case that minority students are better o under armative action. To illustrate
this point, suppose that one can convincingly establish that blacks are less likely to pass bar exams
after attending an elite law school. Does this necessarily mean that blacks are worse o in an ex
ante expected utility sense? If attending an elite university also makes it possible for blacks to be
high-prole judges, and if the outcome of being a high-prole judge is valued by blacks much higher
than just passing the bar exam, blacks could still be better o ex ante under armative action.
Alternatively, it is possible that elite universities may provide amenities to minority students that
1In both Regents of University of California v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and more recently in Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Supreme Court ruled that the educational benets of a diverse student body is a
compelling state interest that can justify using race in university admissions.
2See Kellough (2006) for a concise introduction to various arguments for and against armative action.
3Arcidiacono, Khan, and Vigdor (2008) also suggest that armative action actually leads to less inter-racial
interaction due to the exacerbation of the within-school gap between minority and majority academic backgrounds.
1more than compensate the worse outcome measures that are examined by the researcher, thus
making the minority students better o ex ante in an expected utility sense.
In this paper we take a new and complementary viewpoint to the above-mentioned literature
on mismatch by bringing to the center the rational decision of the minority students who are
oered admission to a selective school, possibly due to armative action policies. The question we
ask is, why would students be willing to enroll themselves at schools where they cannot succeed,
as the mismatch hypothesis stipulates? Posing the question in this way immediately leads us to
focus our attention to the role of asymmetric information. We show that a necessary condition for
mismatch to occur once we take into account the minority students' rational enrollment decisions
is that the selective university has private information about the treatment eect of the students.4
In the absence of asymmetric information about her treatment eect in the selective university
(relative to attending a non-selective university), a minority student will choose to enroll in the
selective university only if her treatment eect is positive, thus there is no room for mismatch to
occur. However, when the selective university has private information about a minority student's
treatment eect, it is possible that a minority student with a negative treatment eect may end up
enrolling in the selective university if oered admission. The reason is simple: when the minority
student decides whether to enroll in the selective university, she can only condition her decision
on the event that her treatment is above its admission threshold. When the selective university's
admission threshold for the minority student is negative, due to its desire to satisfy a diversity
constraint for example, it may still be optimal for a minority student with a negative treatment
eect to enroll as long as the average treatment eect conditional on admission is higher than that
from the non-selective university.
The central message from the simple model is that the presence of private information by the
selective university regarding the students' treatment eect is a necessary condition for mismatch
eect as a result of armative action. This simple observation leads to a novel test for a necessary
condition for mismatch, which is a test for whether selective universities possess private information
regarding the students they admit. We will emphasize that our test is only a test for necessary
condition: if we nd strong evidence for asymmetric information, it does not necessarily imply
that mismatch has occurred. However, if we nd no evidence for asymmetric information, then we
can rule out mismatch without having to rely on strong unveriable assumptions needed for the
assessment of counterfactual outcomes.
We propose a non-parametric method to test for asymmetric information. We assume that the
researcher has access to the elite university's assessment of the applicants, the applicants' subjective
4There is some evidence in the literature that students' expectations about their performance are inaccurate and
updated over time. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) have information at multiple points during the student's
college career from Berea college. They nd strong evidence of students updating their expectations over time and
making decisions (such as the decision to drop out) based upon the new information they receive through their grades.
2expectation about their post-enrollment performance in the selective university and their actual
performance. We show that the celebrated Kotlarski (1967) theorem can be used to decompose the
private information possessed by the applicant, the private information possessed by the selective
university, and the information common to the selective university and the applicant but unobserved
to the researcher.5 We propose an estimation method after the Kotlarski decomposition to test
whether the selective university possess private information important for the prediction of the
students' actual post-enrollment outcomes.
We use data from the Campus Life and Learning Project (CLL), which surveys two recent
consecutive cohorts of Duke University students before and during college. The survey was ad-
ministered to all under-represented minorities in each of the cohorts as well as a random sample
of whites and Asians. The CLL provides information about the participants' college expectations,
social and family background, and satisfaction measures as well as providing condential access to
students academic records. The key features of the data for our purposes is that we have Duke
Admission Oce's ranking of the applicants as well as the student's pre-enrollment expectations
about their grade point average. We also have a rich set of control variables about the students'
family and high school background.
We test whether Duke's private information is important to outcomes such as grade point aver-
age after conditioning on what is in the student's information set, including the private information
in the student's expected grade point average. Not only is Duke's private information important for
both grades and graduation rates even after conditioning on the student's information set, but we
also nd that the student has virtually no private information on their probabilities of succeeding.
That is, once we condition on Duke's information set, the student's expected grade point average
is virtually uncorrelated with their grades.
We will also discuss in Section 7 how we can follow up our necessary condition test with addi-
tional data collection to more conclusively establish the presence or absence of mismatch. It is also
important to note that, regardless of whether we can empirically establish the presence/absence of
mismatch, our simple theory highlighting the rational enrollment decisions of the students naturally
suggests policies that will be eective to decrease the possibility of mismatch, namely, to increase
the information ow from the selective university to the minority students that can assist them in
predicting their post-enrollment educational outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the mismatch
literature. In Section 3 we present a simple model of a selective university's admission problem with
rational students to clarify the key concepts of mismatch in our framework, and illustrate that the
selective university's private information is a necessary condition for mismatch to occur. In Section
4 we describe the Campus Life and Learning (CLL) Project data that we use in our application
5Kotlarski theorem has been applied in economics in Krasnokutskaya (2008) and Cunha, Heckman and Navarro
(2005).
3to test for private information. In Section 5 we provide some baseline regressions to provide
some preliminary bounds the importance of Duke and student private information in predicting
students' performance at Duke. In Section 6 we describe a non-parametric empirical method to
identify private information and present our main empirical results. In Section 7 we discuss two
potential avenues to provide more conclusive evidence for mismatch; and Section 8 concludes. In
the Appendix, we discuss some data attrition issues and report some omitted regression coecients.
2 Mismatch Literature
The mismatch literature to date has focused on comparing the \outcome" (e.g., GPA, bar
passage, post-graduate earnings etc.) of the minority students enrolled in elite universities relative
to the corresponding counterfactual outcome when these minority students attend less selective
universities. As well summarized in Rothstein and Yoon (2008), the papers dier in how the
counterfactual outcomes are assessed. For example, Sander (2004) rst used a comparison of black
and white students with the same observable credentials, who typically attend dierent law schools
because of armative action, to estimate a negative eect of selectivity on law school grades; he
then included both selectivity and grades in a regression for graduation and bar passage where he
found that both selectivity and grades have positive coecient, with the latter much larger than
the former.6 Combining these two ndings, he concluded that, on net, preferences in law school
admission in favor of black students depressed black outcomes because such preferences led black
students into more selective schools, lowering their law school grades, which swamps the positive
eective of attending a selective school on their graduation and passing the bar.
Ayres and Brooks (2005), Ho (2005), Chambers et. al. (2005) and Barnes (2007), however,
used versions of selective-nonselective comparison, i.e., comparing students of the same race and
same observable admission credentials who attend more- and less-selective schools to assess whether
attending more selective schools has negative eects.7 All strategies used above to assess the coun-
terfactual outcome are likely to yield biased estimates when there are unobservable characteristics
that may be considered in admission but unobserved by researchers. For example, the selective-
unselective comparison used by Ayres and Brooks (2005), Ho (2005), Chambers et. al. (2005) and
Barnes (2007) are likely to underestimate mismatch eect because those who are admitted to more
6Loury and Garman (1995) appears to be the predecessor of the \mismatch" literature. They found that college
selectivity and performance at college both have signicant eects on earnings. The earnings gain by black students
from attending selective colleges are oset by worse college performance for those Black students whose own SAT
scores are signicantly below the median of the college they attended, i.e. those \mismatched" blacks.
7Barnes (2007) also explains that the performance for black students may suer in a selective school both because
of mismatch, i.e., they are over-placed in such selective schools, or because there are race-based barriers to eective
learning in selective schools.
4selective schools are likely to have better unobserved credentials.8 In contrast, Sanders (2004), by
attributing the black's lower grades in selective schools to school selectivity instead of potential
unobserved credentials, is likely to overstate the mismatch eect.
Finally, Rothstein and Yoon (2008) used both the selective-unselective and the black-white
comparisons to provide bounds for the mismatch eect in law school. They nd no evidence of
mismatch eects on any students' employment outcomes or on the graduation or bar passage rates
of black students with moderate or strong entering credentials, a group that makes up 25% of the
sample. However, they could not conclusively nd eects for the bottom 75% of the distribution
due to not having enough whites with similar credentials. We will argue that the success of the
top 25% is necessary for mismatch to occur if blacks at least know the overall relationship between
credentials and success while only have expectations on their own credentials. Namely, if all blacks
were mismatched then there would be no scope for students making rational decisions to attend
schools where they were mismatched: there has to be some non-mismatched black students in order
for rational mismatch to occur.
To summarize, the existing literature on the mismatch eect diers in the empirical strategy
used to assess the counterfactual outcome of minority students attending less selective universities;
and the evidence is mixed. We want to recast the mismatch problem in the context of rational de-
cision making which, as show in the next section, points us towards examining whether universities
have private information on the future success of their students.
3 The Model
Consider two universities that dier in selectiveness. For convenience, suppose that only one
university is selective, which we refer to as the elite university. The elite university has an enrollment
capacity C; but the non-selective university, which essentially encompasses all the other options for
the students in our model, does not have a capacity constraint.
Students belong to one of two racial groups, and for concreteness, we will call them \White
(w)" and \Black (b)." The total number of race r applicants is given by Nr for r 2 fw;bg: Let
Tr 2 R denote the \treatment eect" of a student with race r 2 fw;bg from attending the elite
university. The \treatment eect" measures the dierence in a student's outcome from attending
8Dale and Krueger (2002) proposed and applied a strategy to control for the unobservable credentials in estimating
the treatment eect of attending highly selective colleges by comparing students attending highly selective colleges
with others admitted to these schools but enrolled elsewhere. Ayres and Brooks (2005) and Sanders (2005b) also
attempted to approximately apply the Dale and Krueger strategy by comparing law students who reported attending
their rst choice schools with those who reported attending their second choices because their rst choices were too
expensive or too far from home. A potential problem is that they do not know whether those reporting attending
their second choice would have been admitted to the schools attended by the former group, thus it is not clear that
such a strategy does control for unobserved credentials.
5the elite university instead of her second option (which in this model is the non-elite university).
Importantly, this treatment eect is determined by the quality of matching between the student's
own characteristics and the university's characteristics. To the extent that the non-elite university
is better suited to some students, Tr could be negative. In the population of race r students, Tr is
distributed according to a continuous CDF Fr with density function fr:
We assume that the objective of the elite university is to maximize the total treatment eect
for the admitted students subject to a capacity constraint and to a diversity constraint.9; 10 We
assume that the student is risk neutral, and thus will choose the university (if she is admitted) that
oers her the highest treatment eect.
3.1 The Case of Symmetric Information and Diversity Concerns
We rst consider the case that the students know their treatment eects from attending the
elite university.11 In this symmetric information case, no students with a negative treatment eect
will matriculate in the elite university, even if they are admitted. Note if the university admits
a student of race r and treatment eect T0
r, then it will also admit all students of race r who
have treatment eects above T0
r. Let T
r denote the lowest treatment eect among those who are
admitted of race r. Thus the matriculation constraint for the students must be
T
r  0 for r 2 fw;bg:
It is this constraint that eectively makes ex ante mismatch under symmetric information im-
possible: no student will attend a school where their treatment eect is negative. Note that the
matriculation constraint must hold regardless of the objective function of the elite university.
The elite university's problem is then to maximize the treatment eect of its student body
subject to three constraints:
 That enrollment is no larger than C (capacity constraint);
 That the fraction of blacks attending is no less than   0 (diversity constraint);
9The elite university may have other factor besides the treatment of the student in their objection function such
as future donations or whether the treatment eect is positive relative to not attending college. We note the eect
of dierent objective functions throughout this section, though fundamentally a dierent objective function by the
university will not change our conclusion that mismatch can only occur when the university has private information
about the treatment eect for the student. It will become clear that the key driver of our result is the rational
matriculation constraint of the students, not the objective function of the elite university.
10While we treat diversity as a constraint that must be satised here, the qualitative results do not change if we put
a penalty function that penalizes deviations from optimal diversity levels into the objective function. These results
are available upon request.
11Alternatively, both the student and the school could be uncertain about the treatment eect. The key assumption
is that they are operating with the same information set: the university does not have private information.
6 That the expected treatment eect for individuals of both races is positive (matriculation
constraint).
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r  0 for r 2 fw;bg; (4)
We index the solutions to the above problem by T
r (): Thus, the solution when there is no
diversity constraint is T
r = T
r (0): When  = 0, the university is indierent between black and
white students conditional on their treatment eect, implying that T
r (0) = T(0) for all r. If
setting the cuto treatment eect to zero does not violate the capacity constraint, then T(0) = 0.
Otherwise, T(0) uniquely solves
Nw [1   Fw (T)] + Nb [1   Fb (T)] = C:
Note that even though the admission cutos are the same for blacks and whites, the racial com-
position of the student body may be very dierent from the overall composition of the applicants
because Fw () 6= Fb ():
The solution found when  = 0 will be the same as the solution for all 's that are suciently
small. Denote as p(0) the fraction of blacks in the student body when  = 0:
p(0) =




Let 1 = p(0). If   1, then the presence of the diversity constraint does not aect the solution to
the elite university's maximization problem: varying  in this range has no impact on the diversity
of the elite university.
The second relevant cuto point is when the admissions standard is set to zero, leading all
blacks who have positive treatment eects to be admitted. Denote this cuto by 2:
2 =
Nb [1   Fb (0)]
C
:
When  2 [1;2]; the solution to the elite university's problem are implicitly characterized by:
Nb [1   Fb (T
b ())] = C
Nw [1   Fw (T









Figure 1: The Total Treatment Eects as a Function of the Diversity Concern : The Symmetric
Information Case.
Notes: At  < 1; the diversity constraint does not bind. At   2; all blacks with positive treatment eects attend
the elite university.
That is, T
b () and T
w () will be chosen to satisfy exactly the capacity and the diversity constraints.
When  > 2; however, the optimal solution is to set T
b () = 0; to choose T
w () to meet the
diversity constraint, and leave the capacity constraint slack. No more blacks are induced to attend
by increasing  as all blacks who have positive treatment eects are already attending. The cuto
treatment eect for white, T
w (), is then chosen so that
Nb [1   Fb (0)]













which is less than the allowable capacity C:
We now have all the pieces we need to qualitative describe the total treatment eect for each






8Given the above discussion, we know that r () can be depicted as in Figure 1. Between 0 and
1, the treatment eect for blacks and whites is unchanged with increases in  as the diversity
constraint is slack. Between 1 and 2, the treatment eect for blacks rises at the expense of the
treatment eect for whites. Past 2, the treatment eect for whites falls with no change in the
black treatment eect as blacks are already at their maximum treatment eect at 2.
In sum, when both the university and the student operate from the same information set,
diversity constraints at least weakly increase the treatment eect for blacks:
Proposition 1 When there is symmetric information about students' treatment eects, the optimal
admission policy of the elite university with diversity concerns must have non-negative admission
standards; and the total treatment eect of black students is non-decreasing in the degree of diversity
concern as measured by :
3.1.1 The Case of Asymmetric Information and Diversity Concerns
Now we consider the case where the elite university has private information about the treatment
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r )]  C; (6)
Nb [1   Fb (T
b )]







r ]  0 for r 2 fw;bg; (8)
where   0 again measures the degree of the elite university's diversity concern. Note that the only
dierence between the case with asymmetric information from the case with symmetric information
lies in the dierence between the student matriculation constraints (4) and (8). Under asymmetric
information, the elite university can potentially attract students with negative treatment eects to
enroll as long as the expected treatment eect is positive.
To characterize the solution to the elite university's maximization problem, it is useful to denote
^ Tb < 0 as dened by
E
h













that is, 3 is the maximal fraction of black students that can be achieved by the elite university










Figure 2: The Total Treatment Eects as a Function of the Diversity Concern : The Asymmetric
Information Case.
Notes: At   1; the diversity constraint does not bind. At   2; the marginal admitted black has a negative
treatment eect. At   3; the matriculation constraint binds. For   ^ ; blacks are overall worse o with
armative action than without armative action in terms of ex ante expected treatment eects.
by denition, the total treatment eect for blacks at 3 is exactly zero:
b (3) = 0:
Again consider the interesting case where the elite university's capacity constraint binds. The
solution to the elite university's problem is again very simple. If the diversity concern  is less
than 1; the elite university does not need to modify its admission standards; if  2 (1;3);
the elite university would have to lower the admission threshold for the blacks, and as a result of
the capacity constraint, to increase the admission threshold for the whites correspondingly. The
admission thresholds T
r () are again implicitly dened by
Nb [1   Fb (T
b ())] = C
Nw [1   Fw (T
w ())] = (1   )C:
When  > 3; the elite university can no longer increase black enrollment by lowering the admission
standard because of the binding enrollment constraint (8). Thus the only way it can satisfy the
diversity constraint is to admit fewer white students. As a result, when  > 3; the elite university's




10which is less than the allowable capacity C: The eect of the diversity concern  on the total
treatments of black and white students in this case is depicted in Figure 2. Note that the key
dierence between Figure 1 (the symmetric information case) and Figure 2 (the asymmetric in-
formation case) is that in the asymmetric information case, increases in  may lead a decrease of
the black total treatment eect relative to the case with no diversity concerns ( = 0): In fact, the






The following proposition summarizes the key results from this section:
Proposition 2 In the asymmetric information case, the elite university's admission threshold for
the black students, T
b (); is strictly decreasing in the extent of the diversity concern  as long
as   3. However, the total treatment eect for the blacks, b (); is not monotonic in : In
particular, when  > ^ ; b () < b (0):
3.2 Mismatch and Asymmetric Information
We are now ready to present our main conclusion from the analysis so far. First, let us pro-
vide several notions of \mismatch" as a result of armative action admission policies by the elite
university.
Denition 1 We say that armative action admission policy by the elite university leads to a local
mismatch eect for blacks if some black students with negative treatment eects are admitted and
enroll, that is, if T
b () < 0:
Denition 2 We say that armative action admission policy by the elite university leads to a









Equivalently, (9) can be written as
E[TbjTb  T
b ()][1   Fb (T
b ())] < E[TbjTb  T
b (0)][1   Fb (T
b (0))]:
Note that T
b (0) = T
b  0 regardless of whether the elite university has asymmetric information
about the students' treatment eects. Together with the fact that T
b () is weakly decreasing in
; we can conclude that a global mismatch is possible only if T
b () is suciently negative. Thus
global mismatch must imply local mismatch.
Because both the local and global notions of mismatch require that the admission thresholds for
blacks, T
b (), to be suciently negative, and students with negative treatment eect will choose to
attend the elite university only when they are not fully knowledgeable about their treatment eect,
11we conclude that a necessary condition for mismatch to occur is that the elite university has private
information regarding the students' treatment eect. Combining the results from Propositions 1
and 2, we have:
Proposition 3 A necessary condition for either local or global mismatch to result from arma-
tive action admission policy is that the elite university has private information about the students'
treatment eect.
4 The Campus Life and Learning (CLL) Project Data
In Section 3, we argued that once we take into account the students' rational matriculation
decisions, a necessary condition for either local mismatch or global mismatch to arise is that the elite
university has private information about the students' treatment eects. In our empirical section,
we propose tests for private information by the elite university. If our tests reject the presence of
private information by the elite university, then we can conclude that mismatch does not arise as
a result of armative action admission policies; however, if we detect private information, it is not
sucient to establish that mismatch occurred.
In this section, we describe data from the Campus Life and Learning Project (CLL) at Duke
University that will allow us to test whether Duke has private information regarding the future
success of their students.12 CLL is a multi-year prospective panel study of consecutive cohorts of
students enrolled at Duke University in 2001 and 2002 (graduating classes of 2005 and 2006).13
The target population of the CLL project included all undergraduate students in Duke's Trinity
College of Arts & Sciences and Pratt School of Engineering. Using the students' self-reported racial
ethnic group from their Duke Admissions application form, the sampling design randomly selected
about 356 and 246 white students from the 2001 and 2002 cohorts respectively, all black and Latino
students, about two thirds of Asian students and about one third of Bi-Multiracial students in each
cohort. The nal design across both cohorts contains a total of 1536 students, including 602 white,
290 Asian, 340 black, 237 Latino and 67 Bi-Multiracial students.
Each cohort was surveyed via mail in the summer before initial enrollment at Duke, in which
they were also asked to sign an informed consent document, as well as given option of providing
condential access to their student information records at Duke. About 78 percent of sample mem-
bers (n = 1185) completed the pre-college mail questionnaire; with 91 percent of these respondents
providing signed release of their institutional records for the study. In the spring semester of the
12A description of the CLL Project and its survey instruments can be found at
http://www.soc.duke.edu/undergraduate/cll/, where one can also nd the reports by Bryant et. al. (2006, 2007).
13Duke is among the most selective national universities with about 6,000 undergraduate students. Duke's accep-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13rst, second and fourth college year, each cohort was again surveyed by mail.14 However, response
rates declined in the years following enrollment with 71, 65 and 59 percent responding in the rst,
second and fourth years of college, respectively.15
The pre-college survey provides detailed measurement of the students' social and family back-
ground, prior school experiences, social networks, and expectations of their college performance.
In particular, students were asked
\What do you realistically expect will be your cumulative GPA at Duke after your rst
year?"
We can then relate this measure to the student's actual rst year grade point average (GPA).The
in-college surveys contain data on social networks, performance attributions, choice of major, resi-
dential and social life, perception of campus climate and plans for the future.
For those who released access to their institutional records, we also have information about their
grades, graduation outcomes, test scores (SAT and ACT) and nancial aid and support. Further,
we have the Duke Admission Ocers' rankings of their applications on six measures: achievement,
curriculum, essay, personal qualities, recommendations and test scores. Each of these rankings are
reported on a ve point scale. It is these rankings coupled with student expected performance that
will be used to disentangle what the student knows from what the institution knows about how
well the student will perform in college.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the key variables in the CLL data set by race. The rst
rows reveal that there is substantial amount of variation in entering credentials among students of
dierence races. Asians and Whites tend to have higher evaluations by Duke Admission Ocers in
all six categories than black and Latino students, with test score showing by far the largest gap.
Despite these dierences in credentials, black and white students have quite similar expectations
about their GPA during their rst year in college (3.51 for whites and 3.44 for blacks).16
However, Table 1 shows that there is a signicant racial dierence in the actual rst year
cumulative GPAs. The actual GPA for blacks is on average 2.90, in contrast to that for whites
(3.33) and for Asians (3.40). In fact a t-test rejects the null hypothesis of equal means. Notice
that, for all races, the students' actual rst year GPAs are on average lower than their expected
GPAs. This suggests that all students have over-optimistic expectations. However, this optimism
bias is much stronger for black (0.54) and Latino (0.4) students than for white (0.18) and Asian
(0.27) students. Again, a t-test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of means.
Of course, part of the actual GPA dierences across races are predicted by observable dierences
across races in their entering credentials. For example, Table 1 shows Asians and whites have
14The survey was not conducted in the third year as many Duke students study abroad during that year.
15In the appendix we examine who attrits and test for non-repsonse bias.
16A t-test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal means.
14substantially higher (more than one standard deviation) SAT scores than Latino and black students.
Average family income for Black students tend to be lower than Asians and Latinos, which in turn
are lower than the whites. The parents of white students tend to have higher educational attainment
than blacks.
The key question is then, why do the black and Latino students suer a worse bias in their
expectation about their academic performance at Duke? Does Duke Admission Oce's evaluation
of their application contain valuable information that would have been useful in help these stu-
dents form more realistic expectations? If the black and Latino students were able to form more
realistic expectations about their academic performance at Duke, would they have reconsidered
their decisions to enroll at Duke? These are the key empirical questions related to the mismatch
hypothesis.
5 Baseline Regressions
While the CLL data set has the advantage of reporting both information from the students
regarding their expected grades and information from Duke regarding the ranking of the applicant,
disentangling Duke's private information from what the student knows is challenging. We begin by
running some baseline regressions which may bound the amount of private information both the
student and Duke have about student's performance.
We begin by examining the dierence between the student's expected GPA for their freshman
year, ExpGPA, and their actual cumulative GPA for their freshman year, GPA.17 Specically we
see how forecastable this dierence is with variables the student should know the eects of, such as
their race and SAT scores. Let Z indicate this set of variables. We then add variables the student
might only have partial information about such as Duke's ranking of the student (DukeEv). The
forecast error for student i is then:
GPAi   ExpGPAi = Zi1 + i1 (10)
GPAi   ExpGPAi = Zi2 + DukeEvi2 + i2 (11)
where the 's are the projection errors.
Results from regressions (10) and (11) are reported in Table 2.18 For ease of interpretation, we
adjusted the SAT score such that it has zero mean and a standard deviation of one. Column 1 of Ta-
ble 2 shows that students underestimate the relationship between their SAT score and performance.
17In our data, the correlation between student's actual cumulative GPA (GPA)and their expected GPA
(ExpGPA)at the end of their rst year is 0.178.
18We have also experimented with specications that include high school characteristics (private, public, religious
etc.) in the regressions. Their coecients are not signicant and they neither aect the other coecient estimates,
nor signicantly increase the R
2 of the regressions.
































Controls for Duke Eval? No Yes
R2 0.088 0.148
Notes: Dependent variables is (GPA ExpGPA); N = 938. Adjusted SAT is the SAT score normalized to have zero
mean and a standard deviation of one. The coecients on the Duke evaluation rankings are reported in Table A.1
in the Appendix. *, ** and *** indicate that the coecient is signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Virtually all groups on average over-predict their performance, with the one exception being white
females with SAT scores more than one standard deviation above the mean. As expected given
the descriptive statistics in Table 1, blacks signicantly overestimate their performance relative to
the other racial groups. Further, the variance of (GPA-ExpGPA) is 0.27 and is actually higher
than the variance of rst year GPA, which is 0.22. Clearly if we assume that the student's only
information about their future performance is captured in their expected GPA, then there is a lot
of information that the university possesses and a signicant amount of noise in expected GPA.
Moreover, the statistically signicant coecient estimates on the Adjusted SAT and race variables
indicates that the student does not accurately know how these characteristics translate into their
future performance. Duke, however, is likely to know more accurately about the relationship be-
tween characteristics and performance. Column 2 in Table 2 adds controls for Duke's evaluation
rankings of the students. The R2 increases from 0:088 to 0:148 when we include Duke's rankings,
again suggesting that Duke has either private information about the student's future performance
or in how information known to both the student and Duke translates into future performance.19
19The coecients on the Duke evaluation ranking variables are given in Table A.1 in the Appendix .
16The expected GPA of the student, however, may not reect the student's true information
set. We now test whether the university has private information under a more restrictive setting.
Namely, we assume students know how their SAT scores and other demographics translate into
future performance. The information set for both the student and the university then contains
this common observed information plus common information that is unobserved to the researcher.
Under these assumptions, running the regression
GPAi = Zi3 + i3; (12)
and calculating the R2 then leads to a lower bound on the amount of common information that the
student and the university have regarding the student's future performance as it does not include
common unobserved information. Results from this regression are reported Column 1 of Table 3.20
Close to 19 percent of the variation in grades can be explained by these observables. Comparing
this result with that in Column 1 of Table 1 suggests that students underestimate the relationship
between SAT scores and performance by more than 50 percent.
To this baseline regression, we add the student's expected GPA:
GPAi = Zi4 + ExpGPAi4 + i4: (13)
The dierence in R2 between (12) and (13) should provide an upper bound on the student's private
information as it includes not only the student's private information, but also common unobserved
information that is correlated with student's private information. These results are reported in
Column 2 of Table 3. The dierences in R2 between Column 2 and Column 1 in Table 3 indicates
that including the expected GPA of the student increases the R2 by less than 0.01, which provides
an upper bound of the importance of student's private information.
Finally, we add Duke's evaluation rankings of the students:
GPAi = Zi5 + ExpGPAi5 + DukeEvi5 + i5: (14)
The dierence in R2 between (13) and (14) should provide a lower bound on the importance of
Duke's private information. Notice from Column 3 that controlling for Duke's rankings increase
the R2 by more than 0.12, again suggesting substantial Duke private information.21 Note that this
still leaves two-thirds of the variation in GPA unexplained, perhaps due to course selection and
shocks to how students respond to college life.
20Adding additional variables such as family income and mother's education had little eect on the R
2 but did
lead to some attrition.
21One can also reverse the order of the regressions such that we rst control for Duke's evaluation rankings and
then add student's expected GPA. The addition of the student's expected GPA in this order increases the R
2 by only
0.001, with an insignicant coecient estimate on expected GPA.
17Table 3: Baseline Tests of Private Information.
















































Controls for Duke Eval? No No Yes
R2 0.188 0.196 0.321
Notes: Dependent variables is GPA; N = 938. Adjusted SAT is the SAT score normalized to have zero mean and
a standard deviation of one. The coecients on the Duke evaluation rankings are reported in Table A.1 in the
Appendix. *, ** and *** indicate that the coecient is signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
18A drawback of this empirical strategy is that we do not fully observe common information; as
a consequence, there is no guarantee that the reported bounds are in fact the real ones. Further,
measurement error in the expected GPA variable may be contaminating the results. In the follow-
ing section, we implement a dierent strategy that overcomes these limitations; and it allows us to
identify private and common information in order to perform a more accurate variance decompo-
sition analysis. However, it is worth mentioning that both strategies provide surprisingly similar
results.
6 Non-Parametric Identication of Private Information
There is a large existing economics literature that tests for asymmetric information particularly
for adverse selection in the empirical analysis of a variety of insurance markets.22 Most of these
papers test whether the data supports a positive association between insurance coverage and ex
post risk occurrence, a robust prediction of the classical models of insurance market developed by
Arrow (1963), Pauly (1974), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977).23
Our setting substantially diers from the insurance market setting studied in the existing liter-
ature. The empirical insurance literature assumes that private information is possessed by one-side
of the market, the potential insured, and it is manifested through their insurance purchase and
their ex post risk occurrence. In our setting, there is presumably private information about the
treatment eect by both the student and the university. Moreover, the empirical insurance lit-
erature typically assumes either to have access to observations for individuals with and without
insurance and their risk realizations, or to have access to observations for individuals with dierent
amount of coverage and their risk realizations. In particular, the risk realization may be related to
insurance coverage due to moral hazard, but will be unrelated to which insurance company provides
the coverage. In our setting, if a student does not attend the elite university, we will not observe
the student's outcome had he attended it; or if the student attends the elite university, we will not
observe the student's outcome had he not attended. For these reasons, we describe below a new
empirical strategy to identify private information in our setting.
6.1 Available Data and Assumptions
As we mention in section 3, we have data about an observed student outcome Y (i.e. rst
year cumulative GPA, denoted by GPA). Conceptually, we assume that Y is a linear function of
22The rapidly growing literature includes Cawley and Philipson (1999) for life insurance market, Chiappori and
Salanie (2000) for auto insurance market, Cardon and Hendel (2001) for health insurance market, Finkelstein and
Poterba (2004) for annuity market, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) for long-term care insurance market and Fang,
Keane and Silverman (2008) for Medigap insurance market.
23See Chiappori et. al. (2006) for a general derivation of the positive association property.
19XU; XS and XC where XU denotes the unobserved university's private information about student
performance, XS denotes the unobserved student's private information and XC denotes the in-
formation that is common to both students and the university but unobserved by the researcher.
Of course, we can also include a set of variables Z that are common information to the univer-
sity and the students and are observed by researchers, such as observed family and high school
characteristics; we will ignore Z for the discussion here for simplicity.
Specically, suppose that
Y = XCC + XUU + XSS + "; (15)
where " is noise. By construction, and thus without loss of generality, we assume that XC;XU;XS
and " are independent.
Suppose that we also have access to two additional variables: a variable, denoted by WU;
that measures the selective university's assessment about the student's treatment eect given its
private knowledge about the match between the student and the university XU, as well as the
common information XC; and another variable denoted by WC that measures the student's own
performance expectation in the selective university given the common information XC and her own
private information XS.24 We assume that (WU;WS) are related to XC;XU and XS as follows:
WU = XC + XU; (16)
WS = XC + XS: (17)
To summarize, suppose that we observe a data set consisting fWU;WS;Y g and assume that
there exists independent variables XC;XU;XS and " such that fWU;WS;Y g are generated by
(15)-(17).
The question we are interested in is, how do we estimate the coecients C;U and S; and/or
decompose the importance of common information XC, student private information XS, university
private information XU and noise " in explaining the variation of Y in the data?
6.2 Empirical Strategy
We propose an empirical strategy that consists of the following steps:
1. Invoking Kotlarski's (1967) theorem, we separately recover the marginal distributions of
XC;XU and XS from the observed joint distribution of (WU;WS);
2. We draw random samples of fXCi;XUi;XSig from the marginal distributions of XC;XU and
XS recovered in step 1;
24We will describe in Subsection 6.3 below the empirical counterparts of WU and WS in our setting.
203. We obtain samples of fWUi;WSig from the random samples of fXCi;XUi;XSig generated in
step two, and then recover a sample of Yi conditional on fWUi;WSig using multiple imputation
methods.25
4. We run regressions of Y on XC;XU;XS using the pseudo-sample fYi;XCi;XUi;XSig simu-
lated above to estimate C;U and S; and to do variance decomposition.
Now we provide more details about the above empirical strategy. The key is the rst step which
uses a mathematical result known as the Kotlarski's theorem:
Theorem 1 (Kotlarski's Theorem) Let XC;XU and XS be three independent real-valued ran-
dom variables. Suppose WU and WS are generated as in (16) and (17). Then the joint distribution
of (WU;WS) determines the marginal distribution of XC;XU;XS up to a change of the location as
long as the characteristic function of (WU;WS) does not vanish (i.e., it does not turn into zero on
any non-empty interval of the real line).
This well-known theorem is rst proved in Kotlarski (1967) and the proof can also be found in
Rao (1992, pp 7-8).26 The proof of the theorem also suggests how the marginal distributions for
XC;XS and XU can be constructed. Let
	(t1;t2) = Eexp(it1WU + it2WS) (18)




= E[iWU exp(it1WU + it2WS)] (19)
denote the derivative of 	(;) with respect to its rst argument. Then Kotlarski theorem shows
that the characteristic function for random variables XC;XU;XC are respectively given by
















25See Rubin (1987) for an extensive description of this methodology.
26Kotlarski theorem has been widely used in measurement error models in econometrics (e.g., Li and Vuong 1998).
It has been applied elsewhere in economics, e.g. Krasnokutskaya (2008) used in the context of identifying and
estimating auction models with unobserved auction heterogeneity, and Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005) used it
to distinguish uncertainty from heterogeneity in their analysis of life-cycle earnings.
21Finally the characteristic functions of these three random variables uniquely determines the prob-
ability density function via an inversion formula. Let fXC;fXU; and fXS respectively denote the
marginal probability density function for random variables XC;XU and XS: We have, following the






exp( itxK)	XK (t)dt for K 2 fC;U;Sg:
Once we have the marginal distributions for XK for K 2 fC;U;Sg; the remaining steps 2-4
described above are rather straightforward. Now we describe the somewhat standard estimation








































The characteristic functions 	XK (t) for K 2 fC;U;Sg can in turn be estimated by replacing 	(;)
and 	1 (;;) by their estimates above.
Remarks. We have assumed in equation (15) that the student outcome Y is a linear function
of XC;XU;XS. This is for simplicity only. With the pseudo data sets we simulated in Step 3, we
can also estimate Y as a nonlinear function of these variables, or even non-parametrically estimate
their relations.
It is also worth noting in specication (16) and (17), we interpret XU and XS are respectively
the true private information for the university and the student, and assume away noise in the
measurement of the variables WU and WS: If instead the variables we extract in step 1 contain the
true private information of the university and students contaminated by noise, then we will have,
in step 4, a mismeasured independent variables in the regressions. This may bias our coecient
estimates for U and S downward, but when we do variance decomposition for Y; we should still
be able to recover the importance of the true private information of the university and the student
in explaining the variance of the outcome variable Y:
6.3 Implementation Details and Results
As we have already mentioned, it is necessary to have access to (at least) two variables fWU;WSg
in order to apply Kotlarski's decomposition. Here we provide the details of these variables in our
empirical application.
27See Krasnokutskaya (2008) for similar estimation procedure. Horowitz (1998, Chapter 4) describes some useful
suggestions for issues related to smoothing.
22WU is specied as Duke's predicted rst year GPA for the student, which we denote by GPAU.
Specically, GPAU is predicted student GPA from the estimated regression
GPAi = Zi6 + DukeEvi6 + i6;
where GPAi denotes the actual rst year GPA. Recall that Zi are the observed SAT scores and
demographics and DukeEv refers to the Duke ranking variables.
For WS; we consider two alternative specications. The rst specication for WS is the student's
predicted GPA, which we denote by GPAS; predicted from the estimated regression equation (13)
from the previous section:
GPAi = Zi4 + ExpGPAi4 + i4:
This specication implies that students have an accurate idea about how to weight each informa-
tional variable (e.g. SAT) when they predict their performance. The second specication for WS is
the expected GPA (ExpGPA) reported by the student before coming to Duke in the CLL survey.
To the extent that the students may not properly weigh the eect of the observable variables on
their actual GPA, as documented in Table 2, we will be attributing some of the students' wrong
weighting on the importance of common information XC to Duke private information.
Applying Kotlarski's decomposition to fWU;WSg allow us to recover a sample of fXCi;XUi;XSig,
and to construct a sample of fWUi;WSig. The next step is to obtain a sample of grades (i.e. Yi)
conditional on WUi and WSi by multiple imputation, which we follow Rubin (1987).28; 29
Once we have Yi and fXCi;XUi;XSig; we perform a variance decomposition analysis (keeping
in mind that XCi;XUi;XSi are orthogonal to each other) to establish the contributions of Duke
and students private and common information to the variation in GPA.
Table 4 reports the variance decomposition of GPA following two dierent specications for
WS as described above. Specication (1) assumes that students know how to weight the available
information when they predict their performance; results show that Duke's private information
explains 9.1 percent of the variance in the students' actual rst year cumulative GPA; the stu-
dent's private information explains no more than 0.05 percent and the common information 26.5
28The basic steps of Rubin multiple imputation are as follows. (1). Calculate V = (W
0W)
 1; b  = V W
0Y and
b Y = W
0b  where W = fWU;WSg; (2). Draw a random g from 
2 distribution with degree of freedom nobs   r; (3).
Calculate 
2
 = (Y   b Y )
0(Y   b Y )=g; (4). Draw an r-dimensional Normal random vector D~N(0;Ir); where Ir is the
identity matrix of order r; (5). Calculate b  = b  + V
1=2D; where V
1=2 is the triangular square root of V obtained
by the Cholesky decomposition; (6). Calculate predicted values b Yi = W
0
ib ; (7). For each missing value nd the
respondent whose b Y is closest to b Yi and take Y of this respondent as the imputed value (predictive mean matching).
29In order to test for robustness of the results we also implemented a nonparametric approach to recover Yi.
Basically, we draw a sample of Zi conditional on fWUi;WSig from the observed conditional distribution G(Y jWU;WS);
which was obtained using the Epanechnikov kernel (K(u) =
3
4(1 u
2)1(juj1)). The smoothing parameter was selected
by following a rened plug in method, which tries to nd the bandwidth that minimizes the mean integrated square
error. Results obtained using this strategy did not dier signicantly from those using multiple imputation technique.
23Table 4: Regressing GPA on Duke Private Information, Student Private Information and Common
Information.
(1) (2)
WU = GPAU;WS = GPAS WU = GPAU;WS = ExpGPA
Coef. Std. Err. R2 Coef. Std. Err. R2
Duke Priv. Inf. (XU) 1.070 0.037 0.091 0.957 0.023 0.235
Student Priv. Inf. (XS) 0.066 0.040 0.0004 0.037 0.022 0.0005
Common Inf. (XC) 0.993 0.018 0.265 0.994 0.044 0.081
Total 0.356 0.317
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate that the coecient is signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
percent. Specication (2) allows that students may not know how to weight the information, as a
consequence, the fraction of the variance in GPA explained by Duke private information increases
to 23.5 percent, that by common information declines to 8.1 percent, but the fraction explained by
student private information remains about 0.1 percent.
It is worth noting the changes in R2 depending on the specication. First the total R2 in
specication (2) is smaller than in specication (1), this could be due to the loss of valuable
information when students do not correctly weight the available information or it could be due
to students reporting expected GPA with error. Second, there is an important change, similar in
magnitudes but in opposite directions, of the proportion of the variance that could be explain by
common information and duke private information. This seems to suggest that the size of Duke
private information not only depends on what information is not available to the students, but also
how they weigh the information available to them in forecasting their performance at Duke.
Assuming that students are rational implies that coecient on students private information
should be equal one; however as we can see from Table 4, this is not the case. One possible
explanation to this discrepancy is that students may report with error their expected GPA. The
attenuation bias from the measurement error might drive the small R2 we found for the students
private information reported in Table 4. However, if we assume that the discrepancy between
estimated ^ S and the postulated value S = 1 under rational expectations is completely due
to measurement error, we can easily provide an estimate of the variance of the student private
information without measurement error. To see this, note that in the case of orthogonal explanatory
variables with classical errors-in-variables, we have:






S) is the variance of the student private information when it is purged of measurement
error, and Var(XS) is X
S measured with error. Given that we know ^ S;S (which is equal 1
24under the rational expectation assumption) and Var(XS); then Var(X
S) = b SVar(XS): Thus the
fraction of the variation in GPA explained by X
S, denoted by R2; is simply the R2 reported
in Table 4 divided by b S: Therefore, once we correct for measurement error, the fraction of the
variation in GPA that is explained by student private information measured without error (i.e. X
S)
under specications (1) and (2) are respectively equal to 0:006 ( 0:0004=0:066) and 0:0135 (
0:0005=0:037); again, both are substantially smaller in magnitude than the private information
possessed by Duke.
Finally, the results obtained in this section are quite similar to those obtained from the baseline
regressions. Thus, the conclusion that Duke does possess private information that can predict the
students' post-enrollment performance is robust to dierent empirical strategies.
7 Discussion
We have argued that for armative action to lead to mismatch eect in the sense that its
intended beneciary may be made worse o, a necessary condition is that the selective univer-
sity has private information about the student's treatment eect. However, even though we have
shown substantial evidence that Duke does possess private information about the student's future
performance, we can not conclude that there is mismatch.
We would also like to propose two potential avenues that may lead to a more conclusive test of
mismatch. The rst potential avenue requires the cooperation of the selective university's Admis-
sion's Oce. After the admission decisions are made, the Admissions Ocer could randomly assign
admitted minority students into two groups: the rst group will receive the standard admission
letter; and the second group will receive the standard admission letter together with additional
information (e.g. the Admissions Ocer's evaluation rankings of the applicant) that the Admis-
sions Ocer thinks are relevant to predict the applicants' post-enrollment performance. Then if
we observe that the enrollment rate for the second group is smaller than the rst group, this will
prove that the university's private information may have generated mismatch.
The second potential avenue to test for mismatch is to ask the admitted students two questions:
Q1. \What do you realistically expect will be your cumulative GPA at Duke after your
rst year?"
Q2. \Suppose your expected GPA at Duke was X. Would you still have chosen Duke?"
If a researcher with access to the Admission Ocer's private information would have predicted
a student's cumulative GPA to be lower than the stated threshold by the student in Q2, we could
also conclude that there is mismatch.30
30Note that in both cases we would be testing for local mismatch rather than global mismatch.
25However, it is worth noting that even if one cannot conclusively prove the existence of mis-
match, evidence that a selective university possesses valuable ex ante information could be used
in preventing mismatch. To the extent that a university with active armative action programs is
concerned about potential mismatch, it suggests that releasing more information to their applicants
about how the admission ocers feel about their t with the university will minimize possibilities
for actual mismatch. More transparency and more eective communication with the students, and
possibly pre-enrollment sit-ins in college classrooms etc. can help minority students enrolling in an
elite university potentially nd out that they would have been better o elsewhere.
8 Conclusion
We argue that once we take into account the students' rational enrollment decisions, mismatch
in the sense that the intended beneciary of armative action admission policies are made worse o
could occur only if selective universities possess private information about students' post-enrollment
treatment eects. This necessary condition for mismatch provides the basis for a new test. We
propose an empirical methodology to test for private information in such a setting. The test is
implemented using data from Campus Life and Learning Project (CLL) at Duke. The evidence
shows that Duke does possess private information that is a statistically signicant predictor of
the students' post-enrollment academic performance. We also propose strategies to evaluate more
conclusively whether the evidence of Duke private information has generated mismatch.
26Appendix.
In this appendix, we examine the CLL data for drop-out bias and non-response bias. Also, we
report the coecients for the Duke ranking measures from Tables 2 and 3.
A Drop-out Bias and Non-Response Bias
The Registrar's Oce data provided information on students who were not enrolled at the end
semester in each survey year. Non-enrollment might occur for multiple reasons including academic
or disciplinary probation, medical or personal leave of absence, dismissal or voluntary (including a
small number of transfers) or involuntary withdrawal. Fewer than one percent of students (n = 12)
were not enrolled at the end of the rst year; about three percent by the end of the second year
(n = 48) and just over ve percent (n = 81) by the end of the senior year. We combined all of
these reasons and tested for dierences in selected admissions le information of those enrolled
versus not enrolled at the end of each survey year. The test variables included racial ethnic group,
SAT verbal and mathematics score, high school rank (where available), overall admission rating
(a composite of ve dierent measures), parental education, nancial aid applicant, public-private
non-religious-private religious high school and US citizenship. Of over 40 statistical tests, only two
produced signicant dierences (with p-value less than 0:05): (1). At the end of the rst year,
dropouts had SAT-verbal scores of 734 versus 680 for non-dropouts; (2). by the end of the fourth
year, those who had left college had an overall admissions rating of 46.0 (on a 0-60 scale) while
those in college had an average rating of 49.7. No other dierences were signicant. We conclude
that our data contain very little drop-out bias.
We conducted similar tests for respondents versus non-respondents for each wave for the same
variable set plus college major (in 4 categories: engineering, natural science/mathematics, social
science, humanities), whether or not the student was a legacy admission, and GPA in the semester
previous to the survey semester. Seven variables show no signicant dierences or only a few small
sporadic dierences (one wave but not others), including racial ethnic category, high school rank,
admissions rating, legacy, citizenship, nancial aid applicant, and major group. However, several
other variables show more systematic dierences:
 Non-respondents at every wave have lower SAT scores (math: 9-15 points lower, roughly
one-tenth to one-fth of a standard deviation; verbal: 18-22 points lower, roughly one-third
of a standard deviation).
 Non-respondents have slightly better educated parents at waves one and three, but not waves
two and four.
27 Non-respondents at every wave are less likely to be from a public high school and somewhat
more likely to be from a private (non-religious) high school.
 Non-respondents have somewhat lower GPA in the previous semester compared with respon-
dents (by about one-quarter of a letter grade).
These dierences are somewhat inconsistent in that they include lower SAT and GPA for non-
respondents, but higher parental education and private (more expensive) high schools. In general,
the non-response bias is largest in the pre-college wave and smaller in the in-college waves even
though the largest response rates are in the pre-college wave. In general, we judge the non-response
bias as relatively minor on most variables and perhaps modest on SAT measures.
B Omitted Coecients For Duke Evaluation Rankings in Tables
2 and 3
Here we report coecients for the Duke ranking variables that were omitted from Tables 2 and
3. Column 1 shows the coecients when the dependent variable is GPA-ExpGPA, the omitted
coecients from column 2, Table 2. Column 2 shows the coecients when the dependent variable
is GPA, the omitted coecients from column 3, Table 3. The Admission Ocer's ranking of the
student's achievement and personal qualities are very signicant in both regressions suggesting that
they may be the key variable for Duke's private information. Recommendations, however, are only
signicant in the second column, suggesting that student's may have some idea of the informational
content of their recommendation letters.














































































Notes: Base category for each evaluation measure is 2, none of the sample had 1's for any of these measures. Column
1 refers to the omitted coecients in Table 2 (Column 2), Column 2 refers to the omitted coecients in Table 3
(Column 3). *, ** and *** indicate that the coecient is signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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